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 POWER, CORRUPTION AND DISSENT: VARIETIES OF 
CONTEMPORARY CROATIAN POLITICAL CATHOLICISM
1
 
 
By Vjekoslav Perica 
 
Vjekoslav Perica is professor of world history at the University of Rijeka in Croatia. He received 
a Ph.D. in History and M.A. in Political Science from the University of Minnesota Twin Cities.  
Among his best-known publications are Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav 
States.(New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); and most recently “Sport and Nationhood. 
Commemorating Hero Athletes in Post-Yugoslav States.” In Südosteuropa, Vol. 62, H. 1, pp. 50-
66, 2014; and  “Religion in the Balkan Wars.” In Oxford Handbooks Online. (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2015). Dr. Perica is a member of the Board of Advisory Editors of OPREE. 
 
Introduction 
Since 2011, Slavoj Žižek, currently one of the world's most influential philosophers, has 
argued that the Catholic Church of Croatia is the most extremist nationalist force in the Balkans. 
In a London lecture that year, Žižek states, “15 years after the 1991-1995 war in Croatia and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina nationalism in the Balkans did not subside." On the contrary, in some 
cases, nationalism in the Balkans grew even more extremist. Yet it is no longer Serb but Croat 
nationalism that seems the most forceful. According to Žižek, its major characteristic is Catholic 
clericalism. He notes: “The darkest political force in the region, as far as I can see now, is the 
Croatian Catholic Church. . . It is absolutely, openly pro-Ustasha. Church leaders refuse to 
distance the Church from this fascist ideology even in a purely symbolic, trivial way . . .” 2 Žižek 
                                                          
1
 A version of this article was presented at International Conference “Media, Religion and Transitional Justice” at 
University of Novi Sad, Serbia, 22 May 2015.  I would like to thank scholars of religion Zoran Grozdanov and 
Srdjan Sremac and OPREE Editor-in-chief Paul Mojzes, for reading this article and helping me with invaluable 
comments and suggestions.  
2
 Slavoj Žižek, “The Silent Voice of a New Beginning” lecture at the Birkbeck Institute for the Humanities, London, 
UK, on the 20th November 2011. http://backdoorbroadcasting.net/2011/11/slavoj-zizek-the-silent-voice-of-a-new-
beginning/ 
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 is referring to the native Croat fascists called Ustashas, a genocidal organization installed in 1941 
through Axis occupation of Yugoslavia, which was defeated by the communist-led Yugoslav 
antifascist Partisan resistance movement in 1945.  
In several subsequent interviews and lectures, Žižek went on to argue in a similar vein, 
by noting, among other things: “present-day Croatia is a Catholic clericalist nationalistic state, an 
exemplary case of the return of dark medieval clericalism to Europe.” In a recent lengthy 
interview with the German weekly Der Spiegel, Žižek claims that contemporary Croatian 
Catholicism is not a religion, religious faith, or supernatural belief, but a nationalistic ideology 
and a political-cultural project. In his words, 
 our opponent isn't really religion. For example, Živko Kustić, a Croatian Catholic 
nationalist priest, declared Catholicism to be a symbol of the fact that people are not 
prepared to renounce their national and cultural legacy -- 'the whole Croatianness.' This 
statement makes clear that it is no longer an issue of faith and its truth, but rather a 
political-cultural project. Religion here is just an instrument, an indicator of collective 
identity. It is about how much public one's own side controls, the amount of hegemony 
'our' side exerts. That's why Kustić approvingly quotes an Italian communist who 
claims, 'I am an atheist Catholic.' That is also why Norwegian mass murderer Anders 
Breivik, who himself is not very religious, referenced the Christian legacy as a 
foundation of European identity. . .”3 
In April 2015, Croatian pro-regime media launched an anti-Žižek campaign. Historian 
Ivo Banac took a prominent role in it; however, he did not comment on any of Žižek’s theses and 
showed no familiarity with the Žižek’s opus. Instead, Banac commented: “Žižek is ungrateful to 
Croatia where he is always received kindly; I hear he is a philosopher but there is not very much 
evidence supporting it; recently he also poses as an expert for theology and religion in Croatia 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
3
 Der Spiegel interview with Slavoj Žižek: “The Greatest Threat to Europe Is Its Inertia.” Interview conducted by 
Romain Leick, Spiegel Online International, March 31, 2015, http://www.spiegel.de/international/zeitgeist/slavoj-
zizek-greatest-threat-to-europe-is-it-s-inertia-a-1023506.html 
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 which he is not; at any rate, I would not take his thoughts very seriously  . . .”4 In a similar vein, 
sociologist Slaven Letica accuses Žižek of being “an unconscious, militant agnostic. . .  Lacking 
morality and ethical principles." The best response to his provocations, Letica suggests, “is 
considering it of low importance.”5 Paradoxically, the otherwise aggressively right-wing 
nationalist Croatian Church weekly Glas koncila [Voice of the Council], did not join the anti-
Žižek drive. On the contrary, in a recent, theological commentary, the author Krešimir Cerovac 
writes about Žižek favorably. He uses the following  quote from Žižek's essay “Against Human 
Rights,” to attack a resurgent militant atheism in Europe: “In our secular liberal democracies, 
people who express sincere religious loyalty have been brought down to second class citizens 
status: their faith is tolerated as a personal choice but once they publicly lobby for something 
important to them, are being accused of fundamentalism . . ..”6 
The controversy has revived interest in religious nationalism in the postwar Balkans. The 
debate reaffirms the thesis about the relevance of religious organizations, symbols, myths, and 
rituals in contemporary Balkan ethnic nationalist movements and opens additional questions 
regarding their long-lasting impact beyond the war and postwar circumstances. Žižek has also 
reopened some already elaborated theses about Balkan ethnic nationalist movements 
transforming religious faiths into a sacred aura over profane ideologies.
7
 Moreover, Žižek’s 
recent emphasis on Croatian clerical nationalism as the “darkest force” of nationalism in the 
                                                          
4
 “Žižek je veoma obrazovan i talentiran provokator kojeg treba ignorirati” in Večernji list, 3. April, 2015, p. 4. 
 
6
 Krešimir Cerovac, “Kršćanstvo i fundamentalizam”, Glas Koncila 42 (2052), 20.10.2013, http://www.glas-
koncila.hr/index.php?option=com_php&Itemid=41&news_ID=23387 
6
 Krešimir Cerovac, “Kršćanstvo i fundamentalizam”, Glas Koncila 42 (2052), 20.10.2013, http://www.glas-
koncila.hr/index.php?option=com_php&Itemid=41&news_ID=23387 
7
 See Paul Mojzes, Yugoslavian Inferno: Ethnoreligious Warfare in the Balkans.(New York: Continuum, 1994); 
Michael Anthony Sells, The Bridge Betrayed: Religion And Genocide in Bosnia; With a New Preface. (Berkeley : 
University of California Press, 1998); Vjekoslav Perica, Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States. 
(Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2002). 
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 region calls for reconsideration of the established perspective on Serbian nationalism as the 
principal instigator and most forceful factor of the conflict. Possibly, Croatian nationalism is not 
merely a byproduct of the Serbian nationalist upsurge of the 1980s. An autonomous force, it 
outgrew the challenger and arguably, even restored a continuity with Croat fascism from World 
War II. However, Serbian nationalism did initiate the conflict during the 1980s and along with 
the disintegrating Yugoslav Army, dragged the country into a civil war during the crisis of 1991-
1992. In this stage, Croatian nationalism was a reactionary response to the Serbian challenger. 
As war ended with a Croat victory and consolidation of the new nationalistic (anti-Serb and anti-
Yugoslav) Croatia, followed by the NATO bombing of Serbia and Albanian conquest of Kosovo, 
Serbian nationalism lost much of the initial vigor. The Serbian Orthodox church, which 
spearheaded Serb nationalistic mobilization, turned inward, lamented over Kosovo as “lost 
Serbian Jerusalem,” and then turned Russophile. The decline accelerated from the fall of 
Milosevic in 2001 to the independent statehood of Kosovo in 2008. Since then, the most forceful 
ethnic nationalism in the region has become Croatian nationalism with the Catholic Church as its 
backbone and the church-state alliance as the key feature of its national identity.  
While Žižek’s thesis seems to be overall correct regarding the nationalistic extremism in 
the past and present of  the brand of Croat nationalism associated with Catholic clericalism, his 
thesis, however, is not sufficiently thorough and properly placed in a wider social and historical 
context. It also seems premature to judge and thus implicitly consider complete and homogenous 
any “cultural projects” initiated by ethnic nationalistic movements, which destroyed the 
multinational Yugoslavia, and have since labored on reconstruction of nations emerging out of 
its ruins. Žižek’s “Croat Catholicism” today is a religious nationalistic current within a wider 
Church in which there are varieties of approaches, perspectives, currents and circles. This 
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 Church has a role in the making of the new Croat nation and this project is unfinished and 
unarticulated like the other new ethno-confessional identity constructs in the post-Yugoslav 
space.
8
  
Regarding specifically Croatian political Catholicism today, its emphatic ethnic 
nationalistic course is novelty, mostly the result of the 1991-1995 war and the nationalistic 
homogenization under the regime of Franjo Tudjman (1990-1999) and its political successors. 
Otherwise, the Church of Croatia was never monolithic. Its various factions differed over various 
issues including church-society and church-state relations, interfaith relations, and the approach 
to the national emancipation project.
9
 In addition, the contemporary clerical nationalistic turn 
initiated from above, as the episcopate moved close to Tudjman and his Croatian Democratic 
Union, also provoked opposition from below. In some cases, the new dissent has been more 
radical than any earlier form of anti-establishment tendency from within the church. In addition, 
the Croatian Church’s role can be properly understood only in the context of the Balkan conflict 
observed at least from the 1980s to the present. During this period, the dynamics of ethnic 
nationalist movements often shifted gear varying from the initially reserved and cautious Church 
to a militant one and the other way around. However, the contemporary Croatian nationalist 
movement was not an isolated occurrence but a factor in a dynamic interaction with other 
nationalist movements among which Serbian nationalism has played a key role. 
 
 
                                                          
8  n ethno-confessional identities with particular emphasis on Bosnia and Herzegovina, see  van Cvitković, 
Konfesija u ratu.( Sarajevo :  nterreligijska služba  či u oči ; Sarajevo ; Zagreb : Svjetlo riječi, 2004) and            
pogledi na naciju i religiju.(Sarajevo : DES, 2005).  
9
 See Perica, Balkan Idols, pp. 3-16, 17-42, 56-73, and 165-185. 
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 From a Cautious Challenger to Yugoslav Communism to the Co-Ruler of the Croat Nation 
Socialist Yugoslavia (SFRY) was the only Eastern European country in the Cold War era 
that normalized relations with the Vatican in 1965 and since 1970, maintained diplomatic 
relations. While progressive clergy inspired by the Second Vatican council welcomed the change 
and worked on issues such as upgrading interfaith dialogue, ecumenical relations and dialogue 
with non-believers, the largely conservative nationalist bishops exploited the favorable climate 
for a gradual advancement into public sphere promoting ethnic nationalism. The regime was 
forced to tolerate a series of Church-sponsored massive historical anniversaries and jubilees 
called “Thirteen Centuries of Christianity of the Croat People” (1975-1984). Working cautiously 
against the communist regime while also competing with the similar strategy of advancement in 
public sphere and championing ethnic nationalism managed by the Serbian Orthodox Church, 
Croatian Catholicism entered the pre-war crisis of the 1990s under an unofficial label “the 
Church of the Croats”, a fully mobilized leader of Croatian nationalist movement.10 The Croatian 
national Church, the rival Serbian Orthodox Church and the Islamic Community of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the third largest religion in the post-Yugoslav space, participated as key members 
of the warring ethnic blocks in the 1991-1995 war in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.
11
 While 
Croats, Serbs and Bosniaks came out of the war as traumatized and impoverished losers that 
would never recover to the level of prosperity and stability they used to enjoy under mature 
socialism, the three clerical organizations, who allied with leaders of ethnic nationalist parties, 
became the winners, and thus members of the new privileged governing castes and wealthy 
elites. 
                                                          
10
 Perica, Balkan Idols, chapters 4, 9 and 10. 
11
 See Paul Mojzes, ed. Religion and the War in Bosnia. (Atlanta, Ga.: Scholars Press, 1998). 
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 The Catholic Church in Croatia grew even stronger under the regime of the nationalist 
historian Franjo Tudjman (1990-1999) and continued the nationalization project in the post-
Tudjman era. After Tudjman, the Church did all it could to secure continuous power for the 
nationalist Croatian Democratic Union founded by Tudjman. During two terms in power of the 
left-center coalitions (2000-2003 and 2012-2015), several church leaders would label the 
democratically elected government as “traitorous”, “unpatriotic,” and “against the people.” The 
Church, which did not tolerate the two leftist terms,  openly backed the right wing opposition, 
including movements that could be best described as coup d’ etat attempts. The first coup 
attempt took place in 2000 and was resolved by the energetic president Stjepan Mesić with 
discrete help of Vatican diplomacy. The most recent one shook Croatia in May 2015 when a 
group of war veterans took to the streets of the capital Zagreb challenging the incumbent 
government, clashed with police, and found shelter in a church. Each putsch involved prominent 
display of religious symbols, public prayers, and priestly assistance. Although Croatian 
nationalist ideology insists that Croatia belongs to Western European civilization (thus to differ 
from Orthodox Serbs and Bosnian Muslims), the post-communist Croatia is more analogous to 
Central and South American countries of the 1950s and 1970s than to Western Europe. Since 
1990, Croatia has never become successfully democratic. The Catholic Church is presumably the 
most influential anti-liberal social force. It has never accepted democratically elected officials 
lacking the Church’s approval. 
Under Tudjman, Croatia inaugurated a system analogous to “national Catholicism” 
(Nacionalcatholicismo) as designed by Francisco Franco in Spain from 1939-1975.
12
 In a weak 
                                                          
12 
Vjekoslav Perica,
 “The Catholic Church and Croatian Statehood.”  n Vjeran Pavlaković, ed., Nationalism, Culture 
and Religion in Croatia since 1990. The Donald W. Treadgold Papers in Russian, East European and Central Asian 
Studies, No. 32 (November 2001), pp. 55-70. 
OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE VOL. XXXV, NO. 4 (AUGUST 2015) 7
 state with an unfinished nation building process, the Church seems to be the only relatively solid 
national institution and history, the key substance of national identity. Accordingly, it would be a 
mistake to consider Croatian national identity solid thanks to the Church and its consecrated 
myths, cults and liturgies as mechanisms for management of historical controversies and 
traumas. On the contrary, as the Spanish case shows,  
in Spain, a chronically weak state, a divided and largely undemocratic political class, 
and an increasingly polarized social and political climate impeded the construction of an 
effective system of national education and the emergence of a consensus on the shape 
and meaning of the Spanish national past. This in turn contributed to one of the most 
striking features of modern Spanish political and cultural life--the absence of a strong 
sense of Spanish, as opposed to local or regional, identity.
13
  
So, the post-Tudjman Croatia resembled Spain following Franco’s death when coup attempts 
threaten democracy while the “historical amnesia” project faced manipulations with trauma, 
revision, and controversy. Yet, in at least two crises, such as a military coup attempt in 2000,
14
 
and most recently, an anti-government war veterans’ movement, Croatia seems analogous to the 
Spain of 1936.  
In Croatia today, the national Church (and perhaps, the national football/soccer team) are 
the most popular social institutions that enjoy more legitimacy than the state. The Catholic 
Church, however, is not just a state within the state; it is a force above the state. The church 
earned this status above all thanks to the preservation of the ethnic nationalist cause under 
communism and assistance to the ethnic nationalist party, Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), in 
its rise to power after the changes of 1989-1990. Since then, the so-called “Church of the Croats” 
and the HDZ party have virtually co-ruled the nation. The nationalist president Franjo Tudjman 
                                                          
13
 Carolyn P. Boyd. Historia Patria: Politics, History, and National Identity in Spain, 1875-1975 (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1997). Cited from http://www.pupress.princeton.edu/titles/6199.html 
14
 Vjekoslav Perica, “The Most Catholic Country in Europe? Church, State and Society in Contemporary Croatia.” 
Religion, State and Society, Oxford, UK, Vol. 34, No. 4, 2006,  pp. 311-346. 
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 (1990-1999) promoted the Church into national co-founder and the Church consecrated 
Tudjman’s personality cult as the nation’s “founding father.”15 Tudjman’s successor as HDZ 
president and Prime Minister from 2003-2009, Ivo Sanader, a prominent Catholic layman, 
received the Church’s backing during his premiership. Sanader was later sentenced for 
corruption and criminal privatization to 10 years imprisonment and is now in jail but the Church 
never explicitly condemned his crimes. Although Church leaders have sporadically voiced 
concern over growing poverty in society, the Church itself has become one of the wealthiest 
institutions and major beneficiaries of the system popularly referred to as “criminal 
privatization.”16 Church leaders also gladly receive donations and public statements of faith even 
from some of the most unpopular public figures, for example, from Milan Bandić, the corrupt 
mayor of Zagreb, or Zdravko Mamić, the arrogant owner of the “Dinamo” Zagreb football team, 
both of whom publicly pose as faithful Catholics and ardent patriots according to the standards 
of patriotism inaugurated by the Tudjman and Sanader regimes. 
As the Tudjman rule neared conclusion, the authoritarian leader worked together with the 
Vatican on the state religion project.  Four treaties between Croatia and the Vatican signed in 
1998, established the Church as a national institution, Tudjman’s co-ruler and tutor of society.  
Among other privileges, the Church annually receives substantial amount of cash from all 
taxpayers regardless of their religious (non) affiliation, plus additional payments for restitution of 
nationalized property, religious schools’ instructors, parishes and monasteries.17 The Church also 
                                                          
15
 Ivo Goldstein and Slavko Goldstein, “Revisionism in Croatia: The Case of Franjo Tudman”, East European 
Jewish Affairs, Vol. 32, No.1, (2002), pp. 52-64. 
16
 “Ailing Croatia: A Mighty Mess. Croatia is the EU’s Newest Basket Case.” The Economist, July 26, 2014. 
17
 According to a Croatian government report in November 2014, the Church received from the State over the last 
10 years a total of 3 billion in Croatian national currency the kuna (HRK) plus additional payments for nationalized 
property, parishes and instructors of catechism. In the same period all other religious organizations in Croatia 
received from the state 200 million kunas. According to daily newspaper Večernj    st, 14. Nov. 2014,  p. 8. 
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 exercises control over public schools (even including pre-school programs) through appointment 
of catechism instructors, the military and police forces. For example, according to military 
personnel’s private testimonies addressed to human rights groups, everyone on active duty, 
regardless of religious affiliation, is forced to attend patriotic pilgrimages and processions. 
Furthermore, the Church’s pressure regarding the abortion issue forced five leading national 
hospitals to start refusing abortion requests due to physicians’ conscience objection (while some 
of them continued performing abortions in private practice). A Croatian columnist has recently 
written that Croatia is one of the only two European countries in which women today have less 
rights and equality than ten years ago. He argues that “the factors responsible for the worsening 
of women’s position in society are: capitalism, economic crisis and the Catholic Church . . .”18  
Similarly, Croatian feminist author, Djurdja Knežević, stated in a recent interview that the 
Catholic Church of Croatia is probably the most conservative among traditionally conservative 
Catholic countries, specifically, more conservative than the Church in Ireland. “The influence of 
the Church on citizens’ worldview and values here is enormous,” Knežević argues, “while at the 
same time civic values and public opinion are weak. The Croat clergy are hardline conservatives, 
they find the reformist and well-meaning incumbent pope annoying . . .”19 Incidentally, the 
influential Croatian conservative Catholic movement “ n the Name of Family” (U ime obitelji) 
has recently lobbied in Ireland trying to unsuccessfully influence the Irish plebiscite on same-sex 
marriages. Consequently, as the earlier, most conservative Ireland turned progressive, the 
                                                          
18 
Jurica Pavičić,”U Hrvatskoj je sve teže biti žena”, Jutarnji list, 31.Oct. 2014, p. 33. 
19
 “Feministica i književnica Đurđa Knežević: Crkva u Hrvatskoj konzervativnija je i od one u  rskoj”, Novi list 
online edition, novilist.hr, 17. svibnja 2015, http://www.novilist.hr/layout/set/print/Kultura/Knjizevnost/Durda-
Knezevic-Crkva-u-Hrvatskoj-konzervativnija-je-i-od-one-u-Irskoj 
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 movement “ n the Name of Family” succeeded in the 2014 Croatian referendum on this issue 
seeking a Constitutional amendment in order to ban same-sex marriages. 
One of the most striking features of contemporary Croatian nationalism is historical 
revisionism according to which the pro-Nazi Ustasha losers from the Second World War became 
victims and subsequent winners. According to the Church, no genocide took place in the pro-
Axis Independent State of Croatia (NDH) and no church leader or clergy collaborated with the 
Ustasha regime. The wartime archbishop of Zagreb, Alojzije Stepinac, imprisoned by the 
communists was made a martyr. Likewise, 200 military chaplains that served in Ustasha combat 
units that the communists executed for assisting the Ustasha in war crimes and crimes of 
genocide are commemorated as victims of communism. Church leaders either deny or relativize 
the Ustasha genocide, Holocaust, and crimes against Serbs, Jews, and Croat antifascists.
 20
  
Meanwhile, ever since the Tudjman era, the semi-official church newspaper Glas koncila [Voice 
of the Council] has published revisionist articles and interviews about the Holocaust while 
readers’ letters to the editor and sometimes even editorials and columns entail attacks on Jews, 
freemasons, communists, homosexuals, Serbs, and antifascist Croats. In 2015, the Church 
officially registered and funded the association “The Triple Myth of Jasenovac” led by a senior 
Catholic cleric. This association’s mission is to argue that the World War II concentration camp 
of Jasenovac run by the Croat fascist Ustasha regime where between 100,000 to 250,000 Serbs, 
Jews, Romani and Croat antifascists were tortured and murdered, is actually a myth, an anti-
Croat conspiracy plotted by Serbs, Jews, and communists. 
                                                          
20
 See Ivo Goldstein, Slavko Goldstein. Holokaust u Zagrebu (Zagreb: Židovska općina: Novi Liber, 2001); 
Slavko Goldstein. 1941.: g d na   ja se vraća. 2nd ed. (Zagreb : Novi Liber, 2007); Paul Mojzes, Balkan Genocides: 
Holocaust and Ethnic Cleansing in the Twentieth Century. (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011). 
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  The Church implies that postwar crimes of communism against Croats have been worse 
than Ustasha crimes. However, some Catholics are prepared to condemn Ustasha crimes. For 
example, the historian, Ivo Banac, describes the Ustasha regime as authoritarian, criminal and 
pro-Nazi but he views the Church in Croatia as an autonomous moral factor that opposed fascism 
and communism alike.
21
 In contrast to Banac, who as a publicly declared Catholic, has at least 
condemned Ustasha crimes, the official Church has never completely and explicitly condemned 
Ustashism while on an almost daily basis, they have attacked antifascism and communism as 
major threats for more than three decades now. This tendency reached a pinnacle at the May 16 
commemoration at Bleiburg. This obscure episode behind the Victory in Europe commemorates 
the Partisan capture of retreating Ustasha and other NDH forces at the Austrian border. 
Nationalist narrative constructs the Partisan justice and revenge as a myth of heroism, betrayal 
and suffering of patriotic Croat fighters and innocent civilians. The Church led the Bleiburg 
tribute and boycotted the government-sponsored commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the 
Second World War’s end that was held at the memorial site of the World War II Ustasha 
concentration camp Jasenovac. Speaking to a crowd of 50,000 at the Bleiburg field, Cardinal 
Archbishop of Zagreb Josip Bozanić showed compassion for the victims of antifascist revenge 
against fascists but no hint of compassion for the victims of Croatian fascism; he spoke about 
evils of Nazism and fascism in Europe but never labeled the Ustasha regime as evil. For him, the 
contemporary Croat ethnic nationalism and the rise of the far right in Croatia is invented and 
exaggerated by the heirs of the communists and should not worry the Church. Its primary 
concern is, according to Cardinal Bozanić’s repeated statements, the governing left-wing 
coalition that allegedly conceals the truth about the Bleiburg massacre and the corresponding 
                                                          
21
 Ivo Banac, Hrvat    Cr va. Krat a p v jest hrvats  g  at   čanstva u m dern st . (Zagreb and Sarajevo: Profil, 
Svjetlo riječi, 2013), pp. 86-99. 
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 awakening of “a new unpatriotic antifascism” in Croatia, which in the Church’s understanding, is 
the same as Stalinism and other worst kinds of communism.
22
  However, it is worth observing 
that not only did the new Croat fascism that had growing since 1990 provoked reminiscences of 
the Partisan antifascism, but also that the Bleiburg myth-making, Croatian nationalism comes 
strikingly close to the essence of Serbian nationalism, namely, the Kosovo myth. In many 
respects, the Bleiburg myth is a Croat imitation of the much older Kosovo epic emphasizing 
collective martyrdom and revising history by turning actual defeats into triumphant moral 
victories inspiring national rebirth.
23
 
 After the festival of collective national martyrdom at Bleiburg, the  Croatian nationalistic 
movement led by the Church began preparations for a festival of national triumphalism in 
August 2015. The occasion was the 20th anniversary of the final military operations in the 1991-
1995 war in Croatia that resulted in a sweeping Croat military victory over the separatist Serb 
enclave that was followed by an exodus of some 250,000 Croatian Serbs relocating to Serbia and 
the Bosnian Serb republic. The historical event was memorialized by the Croat state as the so-
called “Day of the Victory and Homeland’s Gratitude” to be celebrated on the 5th of August. 
While the HDZ-backed president, Kolinda Grabar Kitarović, and the Social Democrat premier, 
Zoran Milanović, argued over the celebration scenario and other trivial issues in a near bankrupt 
country, the Church moved on to reaffirm the Tudjman cult, further intimidate the opposition, 
and pave the way for the comeback of the new HDZ strongman, Tomislav Karamarko, as the 
new prime minister after the fall 2015 parliamentary elections. On May 24, at the coastal city of 
Ploče, the aspiring premier, Karamarko, unveiled a bronze statue of Franjo Tudjman. On this 
                                                          
22
 “Bozanić na Bleiburgu: Vladaju li u Hrvatskoj snage koje ne žele otkriti istinu o Bleiburgu?“  nternet portal 
Dnevno.hr, on May 18, 2015, at http://www.dnevno.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/bozanic-na-bleiburgu-za-ono-sto-ne-mogu-
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 occasion, the local Catholic parish priest spoke about the authoritarian president and Milošević’s 
partner in crime as a “Croat Moses” and led the chorus chanting “Rise, Franjo, from the grave, 
Croatia is waiting for you . . .” Concurrently, in Zagreb, war veterans wearing white crosses on 
black T-shirts continued with street protests, pressuring the leftist government for an increase of 
veterans’ benefits. Meanwhile, right wing internet portals published lists of purported enemies of 
the state candidates for purges and lustration policies as soon as the HDZ government got 
elected. Amidst growing sentiments of hatred and intolerance, representatives of several ethnic 
minorities in the Croatian national assembly passed the “Declaration on ethnocentrism and 
intolerance in Croatia.” Among other things, the document declares, “ethnic and other minorities 
in the Republic of Croatia feeling increasingly insecure amidst growing fear and intolerance 
appeal for solidarity and help from the government, the EU and associations of civil society.”24 
The representatives of Italian and Bosniak minorities, who signed the declaration, among others, 
point out that the Serb and Roma minorities in Croatia are in the most dangerous situation, 
particularly after the recent call for another campaign of anti-Serb ethnic cleansing that was 
released by Ruža Tomašić, a Croatian representative in the European parliament. 
To summarize the upsurge of nationalist Catholicism in Croatia since the 1970s, the 
Catholic Church of Croatia has been the main channel and until the ascent of the Tudjman party, 
was the only institutionalized form of Croat ethno nationalistic mobilization. Consolidated with 
the ruling Croatian Democratic Union and established as a state religion under Franjo Tudjman’s 
presidency (1990-1999), Croat national Catholicism has since become a national ideology and 
cultural project rather than a religious faith, to borrow Žižek’s term. The pressure of this 
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 chauvinist ideology and powerful institution on society has increased under the incumbent left-
center coalition seeking its overthrow and a permanent rule for the political successors of 
Tudjman.  
However, not all the clergy and active laity approved of the religious ideology and 
Church practice that came out of the alliance between the bishops and the Tudjman regime. 
Actually, the bishops, split roughly in two factions between conservative nationalists and 
moderates, have not always been in concord on all issues.
25
 The largest faction within the 
episcopate, notably represented by the Cardinal Archbishop Josip Bozanić, could be labeled as  
“conformists.” Recently, the most prominent figures in the media have been some bolder figures 
outside the mainstream of the episcopate. For example, on the far right,  the most outspoken are 
the neo-Ustasha hawk Bishop Vlado Kosić of Sisak and nationalistic hardliners such as bishop of 
Gospić, Mile Bogović, and bishop of Šibenik Ante Ivas. By, contrast, among the moderates, the 
most liberal seems to be the Bishop from Dubrovnik Mato Uzinić known for his ecumenical 
meetings with Serb Orthodox bishops and a recent campaign against corruption in the Church. 
Close to him are the  moderates such as the Archbishop of Rijeka  van Devčić and the newly 
appointed bishop of Krk Ivica Petanjak. In addition, there are further divisions in the Church, 
such as notably, autonomous theologians and progressive clerical circles, leftist and progressive 
Catholics, and radical converts. As argued earlier in this article, the Catholic Church is not 
monolithic but a rather heterogeneous structure in which there are individuals, groups, and 
circles that not only differ from the conservative establishment but also dissent or turn radical 
due to various reasons. The following are several such exemplary cases in contemporary 
Catholicism in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.  
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Autonomous Church Circles: Bosnian Franciscans 
In the wake of the Second Vatican Council, Croatian Catholicism engendered the most 
progressive theological circle in the history of religions of the western Balkans. The Zagreb-
based theological circle and publishing house Kr čans a sada nj st [Christian Contemporaneity] 
and the clerical association Dobri pastir (The Good Shepherd) from Sarajevo advanced dialogue 
with the government and with other faiths and voiced criticism of ethnic nationalism and 
clericalism in the Church. Successors of these progressive Catholics emerged in the 1990s 
among the Franciscans of the “Silver Bosnia” province, notably faculty members in the 
Theological College and the Svjetlo r ječ  or “Light of the Word” religious journal in Sarajevo, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. These Franciscans with most of the monasteries, parishes and schools in 
Sarajevo and Central Bosnia, are not to be confused with their brethren in western Herzegovina 
probably best known for their involvement with the making of the controversial Madonna’s 
apparitions at Medjugorje in process since the early 1980s.
26
 The two monastic communities also 
differ politically and ideologically. The Franciscans of Bosnia, while undoubtedly patriotic 
Bosnian Croats advocate of a unified Bosnia-Herzegovina, explicitly condemn Croat nationalist 
extremism of the Ustasha brand and its contemporary derivate seeking the country’s partition. By 
contrast, the Franciscans of western Herzegovina allied with the Ustasha in World War II, 
commemorated the criminal regime afterward as martyrs and heroes for the Greater Croatia 
project restored during the 1990s in the form of Croat separatism in Herzegovina. 
During the wars of the 1990s and afterward, the Bosnian Franciscans fought for a unified 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. These Croat friars clearly stated that the Muslims have been the 
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 principal victims of ethnic cleansing and war crimes and condemned the forces that incited the 
Croat-Muslim war of 1993-1994 and Serbo-Croat collaboration at the expense of the Muslims. 
Some of the Franciscans saved lives of their persecuted Bosniak and Serb neighbors, such as 
notably Fra Marko Gelo (1937-2009) from the city of Livno, who is remembered in a 
documentary film produced by a human rights group from Vojvodina, Serbia.
27
 Bosnian 
Franciscan intellectuals such as Petar Andjelović,  vo Marković,  van Šarčević,  van Bubalo, 
Marko  ršolić, Drago Bojić and Petar Jeleč, among others, criticized the international 
management of the war and peace in B&H, politicization of religion and sacralization of politics, 
ethnic nationalist parties, corruption, and historical revisionism. Fra Petar Anđelović, the 
Franciscan leader administering the Silver Bosnia province during the wartime years, 1991-1995, 
condemned the ethnic parties’ policy of partition and specifically sent message to Bosnian Croats 
in which Franjo Tudjman is described as “false prophet” and his allies from western Herzegovina 
as traitorous forces working against interest of the Croat people. Since then, the Tudjman 
propaganda and HDZ party have labeled Bosnian Franciscans as traitors of the nation.  
As antiwar and human rights activists, these priests sided with the principal victims of 
war regardless of their ethnicity and religious affiliation: these included refugees and the forcibly 
expelled, the families and survivors of genocide and ethnic cleansing, and the multiplying 
numbers of impoverished and jobless, and so on. As supporters of a united Bosnia -Herzegovina, 
the Franciscans joined massive street protests in February 2014 demanding revision of the 
Dayton Accords that sanctioned partition along ethnic lines brought about by criminal practices 
of ethnic cleansing and genocide in the war of 1992-1995. These Catholic Croats earned such 
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 confidence from the country’s majority Muslim community and from moderate Orthodox Serbs, 
secularists, and atheists that after the war, citizens would name Franciscan leaders as candidates 
for state presidency, but the friars declined due to their order’s regulations prohibiting clerics to 
execute political offices.  
The Bosnian Franciscan theologian, Ivan Bubalo, went public as a radical critic of the 
international management of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and expanded his criticism on 
ethnic nationalist parties and clerical elites. In his essays published by the radical Croatian 
journal Feral Tribune in aftermath of the Dayton agreement, Bubalo writes about “Dayton peace 
as a debacle of our arrogant western civilization.”28 Dayton, he claims, “imposes a peace based 
on injustice, plants seeds for future wars, rewards the aggressor and punishes victims of 
aggression”; “leads to a permanent territorial partition unless refugees return in significant 
numbers which is unlikely”; and “unmasks the postmodern western humanitarian 
interventionism as a fraud for the victims of aggression who naively expect relief and justice 
from such interventions.” Bubalo testifies, “Here in Sarajevo during the war, we could daily 
observe all those numerous western humanitarian workers and foreign mediators who walk 
around seeking not how to help the victims but how to obtain for themselves some kind of their 
own selfish gains, or how to carry out propaganda and show themselves off in the mass media.” 
Nevertheless, Bubalo pledges that the Franciscan theological school at Sarajevo will not abandon 
its mission of contributing to cultural, civilizational and spiritual revitalization of the city.  . .
29
 
Bubalo criticizes the Catholic Church for “often functioning by the logic of state or national 
interest thinking that it thus serves the people or ethnic-national community in which it is rooted 
                                                          
28
 Quoted from Boris Pavelić, Smijeh slobode: Uvod u Feral Tribune. 2nd. ed. (Rijeka: Adamić, 2015), p. 304. 
29
 Ivan Bubalo, Minima varia: mali razgovori s vremenom. (Rijeka: Ex libris, 2012), pp. 312-315. 
OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE VOL. XXXV, NO. 4 (AUGUST 2015) 18
 although state and national interest and interest of the people are not always congruent.”30 “ f 
nation replaces God by becoming the only one and absolute,” Bubalo argues, “then, all human 
values and criteria are subjugated to the following one supreme principle which is national 
interest and reason of state.”31 Bubalo admits that a Church including Catholicism which should 
be universal, is often dedicated to the defense and construction of nationhood, as churches in the 
Balkans usually are, thus becoming alienated from the character and mission Christianity. 
"Church leaders, in such a church, run the risk of becoming power hungry," Bubalo writes, 
“because the will for power cannot be put away like an overcoat at the doorstep not even at the 
gate of a sacred space where life is dedicated to God . . . therefore, the dilemma is either God or 
Nation for the two cannot go hand in hand as equals; for a Christian, the question of primacy 
must be clear . . .”32  
Another Bosnian Franciscan monastic leader,  van Šarčević, also voiced the 
disappointment with the West growing in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the 1992-1995 war. 
“ n the case of Bosnian peace process,” Šarčević writes, “Europe has made concession to evil”.33 
He continues to argue that, . . .  “after the war European politicians who have been in any way 
associated with the international intervention in the wars in former Yugoslavia and its successor 
states, have lived in some sort of a corrupt peaceful conscience, in a spiritual despair, in absence 
of a vision, because they doubted their mission regarding the Bosnian war fearing lest they be 
blamed for a new colonialism. . . ”34 Like his brethren, Šarčević blames Serbian nationalism for 
starting the war and perpetrating genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Yet he is no less critical 
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 of Croatian and Muslim nationalisms, particularly the former, because of the compassion he 
expresses for the Muslims as the principal victims of war that suffered the gravest losses. 
According to Šarčević, leaders of Croat ethnic parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina have 
constantly exercised traitorous and immoral politics.
35
 In his view, the leaders of Croat and Serb 
ethnic parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina are two of a kind: “ f, according to Nietzsche, a nihilist 
is actually a powerful man with no compassion for the weak, nihilists are also leaders of Bosnian 
ethnic parties, such as the Croat Dragan Ćović and the Serb Milorad Dodik. Their policies follow 
in the footsteps of Tudjman and Milošević having no compassion for the suffering people and 
victims of the war . . . Dodik and Ćović play Nietzsche’s  verman who is above justice. Dodik 
does this in a vulgar and brave way and Ćović imitates him in a more subtle fashion, both using 
sarcastic and cynical humor and both eventually bring about brutal consequences.”36  
The Franciscan historian, Petar Jeleč, wrote a doctoral thesis about the Catholic Church 
in the Independent State of Croatia during World War II. Through interviews, internet portals 
and his works as a columnist for independent journals, he frequently speaks publicly about 
historical revisionism in contemporary Croatia. For Jeleč, it is clear that the Ustasha state was 
founded on crime, the Ustasha leader Ante Pavelić was a traitor to his people, and the 
Independent Sate of Croatia is an episode from history of the Croats that caused many innocent 
victims. However, he rejects generalizations about the entire Catholic Church as an accomplice 
in crime. He argues that many Croat Catholic clergy refused collaboration and some opposed the 
Ustasha regime. He also points out that the role of the Archbishop Stepinac is hard to re-examine 
now that the Church has made him a saintly cult beatified in 1998 and thereby making impartial 
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 Catholic historians’ work difficult.37 Regarding the Franciscans’ support for a united multiethnic 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Jeleč voices disappointment with the Catholic Church that never 
condemned Croat crimes in the war with Muslims triggered by Croat extremists in an attempt to 
establish a Croat enclave similar to the Serb republic in Bosnia.
38
 
Ivan Šarčević voices similar views about the Ustasha state. He points out that the 
Franciscan order issued regulations prohibiting friars membership in the Ustasha movement but 
some priests disobeyed it, joined the Ustasha, and committed crimes. Regarding the post-
communist Croatia, Šarčević is vehemently critical of the influence of the nationalistic right on 
the official Church. The right-wing propaganda retaliated by accusing the order and in particular 
the Franciscans in the faculty of the School of Theology in Sarajevo, for collaboration with 
Titoism through the regime-friendly “Good Shepherd” clerical association. Šarčević explained 
that Croat Catholics’ participation in the interfaith and Christian-Marxist dialogue was crucial in 
the quest for ethnic harmony, particularly in the multiethnic and religiously diverse Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Šarčević restated Franciscans’ criticism of the Dayton Accords. In his view, it 
ended the war but did not end or reverse ethnic cleansing and gradually legalized the results of 
genocide. Thinking of Bosnia’s future in a wider global context, Šarčević affirms Bosnian 
Franciscans’ sympathy for liberation theology. In a recent interview, Šarčević notes “nationalism 
and capitalism today devour the heart and soul of the Church . . .”39 
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 All things considered, it did not come as a surprise when in February 2014, the 
Franciscans of Sarajevo and other friars of the “Silver Bosnia” province, openly backed massive 
popular protests spreading throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina against the corrupt domestic 
politicians and the ineffective foreign post-conflict management. The friars of Sarajevo marched 
together with rebellious students and Bosnians against the corrupt, unjust, and unworkable 
system. They called for radical social and economic reforms and complete reintegration of the 
country including the revision of the Dayton Accords. These Catholic friars, along with a few 
lower Muslim clergy, were the only prominent representatives of the major domestic religious 
organizations participating in this democratic movement. The protests failed to change the course 
of the post-conflict misery and social decay but the Franciscans did not give up their struggle for 
a renewal of the country hit hardest by the Balkan wars of the 1990s. Most recently, in a 
publication widely red in the whole region, they used humor to promote interethnic and multi-
confessional cooperation. The publication is a collection of jokes, anecdotes, and a comic book 
“The Friars of Bosnia – in Their Own Way.” The author is the priest, writer, and cartoonist, fra 
Tomislav Brković, who is currently abbot of the Rama monastery in central Bosnia. He notes in 
an interview: “That’s not a product of my own wit, I just collected stories, listened to the people, 
after all, we all, regardless of the faith and ethnicity, laugh in our common language and the 
humor is the universal link that bring us together. In our war-weary Bosnia, we need more humor 
and laughter in order to fully recover . . .”40 
On June 6, 2015, Pope Francis visited Bosnia and Herzegovina. In an interview on the 
occasion, Fra Drago Bojić, the former Editor-in-Chief of the Light of the Word Franciscan 
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 journal, stated, “Pope Francis represents a better side of Catholicism and Christianity.”41 He goes 
on to note, “Pope Francis calls for interethnic peace and interfaith dialogue in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina which should be understood as a message to all people to break up with nationalism 
and hostility toward the others.”42 The new Sarajevo Catholic Youth Center “John Paul   ” 
administered by Bosnian Franciscans, hosted the pope’s meeting with several thousand young 
Catholics. The Wall Street Journal reported that at the center, Pope Francis . . . called on the 
young people to make peace across ethnic and religious lines." Pope Francis reportedly told the 
group, “You are the first generation after the war. You have a great vocation. Never build walls, 
only bridges.”43 Bosnian Franciscans welcomed the papal stay in Sarajevo as the nation’s capital 
where the head of the Vatican paid tribute to the flag of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which ethnic 
nationalists avoid to do. The friars praised both the state protocol and the emphatically 
ecumenical character of the papal mission as unambiguous papal support for national unity of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. According to some commentaries, Pope Francis demonstrated that he 
shared the Bosnian Franciscans’ faith in the recovery of Bosnia as a pluralistic society unique in 
European history and culture as it used to be before the crimes of ethnic cleansing.
44
 In addition, 
this papal visit coincided with the anticipated Vatican decision renouncing authenticity and 
sanctity of the Medjugorje movement, which could be interpreted as a blow to the extremist 
brand of Croat ethnic and religious nationalism that originated in western Herzegovina and 
influenced both Bosnia and Croatia proper. 
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Voices from a New Catholic Left: The Cross of Life (Križ Života) Internet Portal  
The progressive Catholic circle “The Cross of Life” began publishing articles critical of 
the Church on the internet in 2002. The founder and Editor-in-Chief of the “religious internet 
magazine Cross of Life”, Hrvoje Cirkvenec, brought together a diverse staff of ecumenically- 
oriented contributors from various Christian churches. The magazine publishes theological 
essays and news from religious life, political columns and interviews.  In a 2013 interview for 
“The Cross of Life,” Branimir Pofuk, a former Catholic journalist, stated: “while Croatia is not a 
Catholic nation, the Catholic Church in Croatia is emphatically nationalistic.”45 The interview 
touches upon a number of critical issues regarding contemporary Croatia’s Catholicism as a 
national institution. Among other things, Pofuk argues: “regardless of the Catholic majority that 
the census shows in Croatia, a kind of democratic society that most Croatian desire, must not 
allow obvious attempts to make Croatia a Catholic state. In the Balkans various faiths join forces 
only against homosexuals but not against war, war criminals and nationalistic extremism. The 
Catholic church is behind plebiscites such as ‘In the Name of the Family’ to ban abortion and 
same sex marriages and some other initiatives, by which Church leaders wish to revise the 
Constitution . . . .”46  
The most vehement criticism from the “Cross of Life” circle targets growing social 
inequality, insensitivity for the poor, corruption in the Church and political elites. The example 
of such radical criticism is a 2014 editorial from the prolific columnist Marijan Vogrinec under 
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 the title “Why God doesn’t’ love Croatia?!” He argues that the Croatian national project is 
failing due to corruption, bad government and a politicized nationalistic Church. While the 
Church is the most influential national institution, it is no less corrupt than the political parties 
and other most influential institutions in contemporary Croatia among which Vogrinec considers 
the national football [soccer] team as especially popular but also one of the most corrupt 
institutions. Among other things, Vogrinec writes: 
 t seems that Croatia has never won God’s favor. How is that possible even though the 
father of the Nation, Dr. Franjo Tudjman (an atheist!), as soon as he came to power 
renounced secularism and turned the nation over into the hands of the Church established 
as a state religion?! In addition, he cemented this new clericalism with four treaties with 
the Vatican (at the expense of the Croat people). Since then, Croatia has hosted the Holy 
Father three times! Meanwhile the Church has achieved in the public domain whatever 
Church leaders want: imposing Church’s dogma from pre-school to higher education and 
even in the intimate sphere of the married couples, families and sexual life? Why does the 
Creator allow faithful Croatia with its 87% publicly declared Catholics to lose important 
international football matches? Why does God let the EU and its rulers in Brussels to 
treat the old European Christian nation of Croatia as a primitive tribe from Africa? It 
seems that the treaties between Croatia and the Vatican have been signed in order to stab 
Croatia’s citizens in the back.  n the country of 4.3 million and the average salary of 
4,000 kunas every employee regardless of religious (non)affiliation has to pay annually 
400 kunas to the Catholic church?!
47
 
In a 2014 editorial, the same “Cross of Life” columnist addressed neo-fascist tendencies in 
Croatia. Under the title, “Reigniting the  ndistinguishable Evil: Ustashas Marching Again 
through the  ur Miserable Homeland” (this is a wordplay to the national anthem “ ur Pretty 
Homeland”), Vogrinec writes: 
The episcopate and the clergy are not semi-literate folk singers (such as Mr. Perković 
Thompson) who do not know what the Independent State of Croatia really was. Instead 
of putting the fire out and explain to the people the history of Croat fascism, some of 
them lead the re-ignition of evil. . .Who are those street marchers dressed in black, 
waving national flags and shouting “For the Homeland – Ready” and “Kill, kill the 
Serb”? The Ustasha are marching again through  ur Miserable Homeland. The founding 
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 father Franjo Tudjman and his émigré right hand man Gojko Susak, made our country so 
close to the far right politics that nobody can rectify these trends anymore because 
fascism has become rooted in our culture . . . Today the people in black shirts celebrate 
the criminal madness of the Independent State of Croatia . . . The same terrorists 
dynamited 3,000 memorials of Croatia’s World War    antifascist struggle and rebuilt 
memorials to the worst Ustasha war criminals . . . Tito and the Partisans led by the 
communists temporarily halted the Ustashas in World War II. Yet, today the Ustasha 
successors are seeking revenge on the memory and the successors of the Partisan fighters 
. . . .
48
 
In a November 2014 commentary entitled “Nation and Faith under Boots of the Church of the 
Croats,” the author attacks Cardinal Josip Bozanić for supporting the war veterans and their 
street politics of intimidation and ultimatum. Vogrines writes, ”the Archbishop of Zagreb, by his 
call for prayers and solidarity with the rebellious war veterans, has again manifested his infection 
with the virus of the political right. For a quarter of century now the same virus had done much 
harm to the Church. . . The Archbishop and the clergy do now show by their homilies that our 
homeland is falling apart amidst a moral and economic crisis . . . .”49 
During the May 2015 political crisis in Croatia, a group of rightist war veterans took to 
the streets demanding resignation of the leftist government, where they then threatened to use 
explosive gas, battled the intervening police and eventually found refuge in a parish church near 
the seat of government. At the time, the “Cross of Life” writer Marijan Vogrinec was, again, the 
loudest critical public voice. In a column for the “Cross of Life” and several independent internet 
publications, he made it clear that these self-proclaimed patriots were, in Vogrinec’s words, 
“cowards and terrorists plotting   up d’ etat and pushing the country into a civil war.“50 
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 According to Vogrinec, the president of the Republic Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović, with the 
Catholic Church highest hierarchy and the chief of the nationalist HDZ party Tomislav 
Karamarko, joined forces with the anti-government war veterans in order to “further aggravate 
social tensions, national discord and intolerance, hoping for an opportunity to assume messianic 
roles in the crisis. Yet, it has become clear to a growing number of citizens of Croatia that these 
forces operate against national interest and interest of each individual citizen by tolerating and 
even encouraging the most vulgar, barbaric and militant disrespect for the key national and state 
institutions, including assault of the Constitutional order and undermining of collective security 
and individual rights of each citizen in  ur Miserable Country.”51 
Although the “Cross of Life” is visible among internet magazines in Croatia and its columnists 
are influential in the progressive public, the Church’s policy is to ignore and marginalize them 
rather than arguing with or persecuting this opposition. However, while top Church authorities 
ignore the “Cross of Life” Croatia’s Catholic right, some Catholic youth circles respond with 
threats and counterattacks. According to rightist internet portals, the “Cross of Life” is written by 
“secularist, anti-Croat, laymen and seminarians  on the margin of the Catholic public, individuals 
excommunicated from the Society of Catholic journalists . . .The Cross of Life advocates anti-
Catholicism, same-sex marriages, anti-nationalism and secularism . . . .”52 
 
Radical Converts: Zdravko Tomac and Drago Pilsel 
Contrary to the triumphalist post-Cold War western media according to which ex-
communist societies of Eastern Europe saw a remarkable religious revival prompted by a long-
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 time suppressed popular thirst for the spiritual and supernatural, most of post-communist mass 
conversions have been motivated by trivial earthly needs such as opportunism, careerism, and 
redistribution of power and property.  n Tudjman’s Croatia, crowds of ex-communists including 
Tudjman himself, flocked to churches and cathedrals, received sacraments and adopted 
theological terms as politically correct features of new citizenship and political jargon. Some 
prominent figures earned celebrity status as radical outspoken converts-missionaries and 
activists, including Zdravko Tomac, who converted from communist atheism and Yugoslav 
patriotism to Croat ethnic nationalism and national Catholicism, and Drago Pilsel, who did 
precisely the opposite, by transforming from a practicing Croat Catholic and an Ustasha into a 
leftist, anti-fascist and human rights advocate.  
Zdravko Tomac began his political career as the associate of one of most rigid Croat 
communists, Jakov Blažević, best known for being Chief State Prosecutor in the 1946 trial of 
Archbishop Stepinac. In the late 1980s, Tomac joined a reformist faction in the Central 
Committee of the League of Communists of Croatia and became a trusted aide to the national 
communist party chief,  vica Račan, who called for the first multiparty elections and delivered 
Croatia into the hands of Tudjman, HDZ, and the Church. During war years, Tudjman entrusted 
Tomac with a key cabinet post in the so-called “national unity” multiparty government with 
Franjo Gregurić as Prime Minister. During this period, Tomac grew into a hardline nationalist, 
supporting policies such as partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina and restrictions on human rights 
activism and freedom of speech in alleged defense of national homogenization and Tudjman’s 
personality cult. In the 1997 Croatian presidential election, Tudjman asked Tomac to pose as 
their challenger from the list of the Social Democrats, i.e. former communists. Tomac was by 
then nationalistic enough to finish as a runner-up to Tudjman, with 21 percent of the vote. In 
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 2003, he formally announced his breakup with the Social Democrats. Subsequently, he has 
become active as a Catholic convert and missionary. He toured churches and parishes testifying 
about mystical experiences, visions, and communication with God. In his numerous books and 
interviews, he writes about various conspiracies against the Croats that he detected and 
unmasked. In the February 2009 issue of the Franciscan journal “Light of the World” published 
in Sarajevo,  van Šarčević analyzes Tomac’s conversion and mystical experiences to conclude:  
“Tomac did not convert to a religion; he substituted one political ideology for another–the 
previous communist atheistic quasi religion he replaced by the atheistic worship of Croat 
Catholicism as a nationalized religion and politics in a religious garb; his atheism did not change 
as he transformed from a communist into an anticommunist.”53 It is noteworthy that even though 
Tomac further radicalized his anticommunism getting very close to the Croatian far right, no 
Croat rightist or neo-Ustasha group backed or appropriated him while some continuously 
distrusted his intentions. 
Drago Pilsel is an Argentina-born writer and Catholic lay theologian from an émigré 
Ustasha family. His father served as personal security guard to the Ustasha poglavnik (Führer) 
Ante Pavelić in World War II and his postwar Argentinian exile. Raised and trained as a young 
Ustasha militant, Pilsel joined the Croat volunteer troops in the war of 1991-1995, got 
disappointed with the Tudjman regime and the morally bankrupt Church leaders and eventually 
became Croatia’s most famous convert from fascism to antifascism. The first time he visited 
Croatia was in 1989 as a member of the Franciscan order. He studied mechanical engineering, 
literature, political science, and theology and has worked as a journalist since 1979. He holds a 
M.A. in Christian theology from the Evangelical Theological School in Osijek, Croatia. One of 
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 the best summaries of Drago Pilsel’s case comes from the pen of Croatia’s leading contemporary 
literary figure Miljenko Jergović: 
In 1991 Drago Pilsel came from Argentina with his brother to fight and die for Croatia, 
the country about which he actually knew nothing except for the émigré myth. Several 
months later, his brother went missing in a senseless naval operation. Search and rescue 
missions never found his body. Nevertheless, Pilsel and his bother have fulfilled the duty 
for which they were raised and trained in Argentina. Pilsel’s native land was actually the 
country of military dictatorships in which a segment of the Croat people lived since the 
end of the World War II. In Buenos Aires, they did not meet Borges and Gombrowicz but 
Ante Pavelić. In his name they went to fight in Croatia. In the summer of 1995 during the 
final battles for liberation of the country from the Serb separatist movement, Drago Pilsel 
witnessed Croatia’s army war crimes against civilians. He realized that it was easier to 
die for Croatia than to step on the corpses of murdered elderly peasants. In order to 
understand who and why murdered these victims in the name of Croatia, Drago Pilsel had 
to get to know Croatia better. That’s what Pilsel has been doing for twenty years now. 
His life and his fate are among the greatest Croatian adventures in our time. By re-
examining his own soul, Pilsel also examines, in a puritan and original manner what it 
means to be a Croat and Christian. While others reset their conscience and revise their 
past to fit the changing circumstances, Drago Pilsel fights intellectual and moral battles 
with his own self. Pilsel made his biography public in order to change himself and society 
in which he lives. We would not learn that he used to throw rocks at a synagogue and 
attempted to set ablaze a crowded movie theater showing a Yugoslav movie, had he not 
written that it was wrong to stone synagogues and set movie theaters on fire . . .Today 
some careerist Ustashas accuse him of being an Ustasha, a fascist. What they actually 
hate most about him today, is that he became an antifascist, anti-clerical, a leftist and 
defender of human rights, particularly for ethnic, religious and sexual minorities. . . 
54
 
In 2013, Pilsel published an autobiographical book under the title “An Argentine Novel.” In this 
book, Pilsel examines his ideological, professional and emotional transformation from an ardent 
Croat Ustasha fascist, anti-Semite and far right militant into a leftist, human rights activist, writer 
and Christian ecumenical theologian.
55
 In addition to the autobiographical material, Pilsel set out 
to debunk old and new Croat nationalistic myths. Countering the myth that depicts the Ustasha 
führer Pavelić as a national hero, Pilsel describes him as a cold-blooded murderer and a coward. 
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 He criticizes the clerical mythmaking about Cardinal Alojzije Stepinac. Contrary to the mythical 
narrative prepared for the canonization, Pilsel portrays Stepinac as an anti-ecumenical priest, 
clerical nationalist, and opportunistic church leader who failed to use his full authority to 
condemn Ustasha collaboration with the Axis occupation of Croatia and genocide perpetrated by 
the Pavelić regime. For Pilsel, the Bleiburg myth, which today Croatia commemorates as de 
facto a national holiday, was in reality intentional Ustasha sacrifice of the Croat refugees. Pilsel 
argues that Pavelić abandoned his people and the Ustasha retreating troops, by refusing to 
surrender and used these civilians as a human shield. Pilsel also demystifies the new Croatia’s 
Homeland War myth. He writes a detailed testimony about Croatian troops’ plunder and 
execution of elderly Serb civilians at the end of the war in Croatia. As a Christian theologian, he 
urges Croatians to seek true “liberation from hatred and the burden of the difficult past.”56 
As an ecumenical advocate, Pilsel tours the Balkans in a belief that interfaith and ethnic 
reconciliation should come from below.  t begins with progressive Catholics’ dissent and moral 
critique of the opportunistic and corrupt clerical elites in the so-called “Church of the Croats”. 
His ecumenical mission reaches out to Serbs, Muslims, and Jews. Thus, amidst rightists’ attacks 
on public inscriptions written in Cyrillic letters, Pilsel confronts the attackers defending the right 
of Croatia’s Serbs to use the Cyrillic script. He also shows understanding for the Serbian 
 rthodox Church’s rejection of Cardinal Stepinac as a saintly cult.  n an interview with a 
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 Montenegrin daily newspaper, he calls himself a traitor to the Ustasha cause and states that the 
thorough liberation from the burden of fascism will be important for the Croats’ mental health.57 
 
Conclusion 
Two decades after the major Balkan war in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina 1991-1995, 
the dynamic of feuding ethnic nationalisms has shifted from the initially strongest Serbian to the 
currently dominant Croatian nationalism. The two strongest nationalisms of the (post)Yugoslav 
region are comparable to each other in many respects including the ethno-confessional 
nationalistic ideology amalgamated with religion and crucial roles for the churches as national 
institutions allied with nationalistic parties. The relative advantage for Croatian Catholicism is 
the outcome of several factors such as the following:  
First, the decline of Serbian nationalism after the defeat of Serb separatism in Croatia 
(1995), the fall of Milošević (2000), and the loss of Kosovo (2008).  
Second, the alliance between the Catholic Church in Croatia and the regime of Franjo 
Tudjman (1990-1999) under which the Church was made the de facto state religion and vital 
national institution authorized with arbitrating what is patriotic and what is not. In short, the 
Church not only became a part of the new power structure but its most powerful institution. At 
least since the 20
th
 century, no other Balkan or European national church has acquired such 
amount of power, wealth and influence comparable to present-day Croatian Catholicism.  
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 Third, since the demise of Tudjman, there has been a continuous mobilization of right-
wing nationalist and conservative forces. This heterogeneous movement acknowledged the 
Church as its supreme authority. The mobilization advanced over historical controversies and 
various largely invented or exaggerated threats to the faith and nation such as unrepentant 
communists, nationally unfit Croats, homosexuals, Serbs, Jews, freemasons, etc.  
Consequently, the conflict continues within Croatia, also destabilizing the neighboring 
countries, particularly Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia. To make things worse, because the new 
national ideologies, systems, institutions, and regimes that have been established in the region 
through the 1991-1995 war draw legitimacy from the interethnic, religious, and ideological 
conflict, hatred and an extended state of siege mentality in postwar societies, changes for the 
better are not feasible without the change in the established structures of power, including the 
national majority religions. 
However, Croatian clerical nationalism as the most rigid among the carriers of the bad 
tendencies is not homogenous as either “church”, or political movement or cultural project; a 
gradual change for the better may eventually come. In the Catholic Church, there are various 
factions, autonomous, moderate or reform-minded, and others dissenting or departing from the 
mainstream in various ways including radical options. The episcopal elite includes right wing 
militants, centrist opportunists, and moderately progressive bishops. Although the former two 
groups now seem more influential than the third faction, for the reasons that world Catholicism is 
currently under a reform-minded papacy and Croatia is an EU and NATO member, the 
moderates and opportunists may under outside pressures shift the course to isolate the extremists 
and alter the strategy of the extended conflict. In addition, there are autonomous progressive 
clerical circles such as Bosnian Franciscans. There are also radical critics of corruption and 
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 religious nationalism on the Catholic left such as the notable Croatian internet portal “Cross of 
Life.” Their radicalism (like the example of the radical converts) is the response in kind to the 
rise of Croatian nationalistic far right in the Church and society as well as the Church leaders’ 
approval of nationalistic extremism. In spite of the current Church-backed shift to the 
nationalistic far right in Croatia, the rise of another Tudjman is improbable because of the EU 
framework. Besides, the country is hard to homogenize and mobilize for conflict as it used to be 
possible in the early 1990s. Accordingly, it is questionable for how long this strong Croatian 
nationalism can retain the current level of mobilization. In all likelihood, Croatian nationalism 
will lose momentum and decline except in case of a recovery and comeback of Serbian 
nationalism that would primarily focus on Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
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